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A hallmark of executive control is the brain’s agility to shift between different tasks depending on the behavioral rule currently in play. In
this work, we propose a “tweaking hypothesis” for task switching: a weak rule signal provides a small bias that is dramatically amplified
by reverberating attractor dynamics in neural circuits for stimulus categorization and action selection, leading to an all-or-none recon-
figuration of sensory-motor mapping. Based on this principle, we developed a biologically realistic model with multiple modules for task
switching. We found that the model quantitatively accounts for complex task switching behavior: switch cost, congruency effect, and
task-response interaction; as well as monkey’s single-neuron activity associated with task switching. The model yields several testable
predictions, in particular, that category-selective neurons play a key role in resolving sensory-motor conflict. This work represents a
neural circuit model for task switching and sheds insights in the brain mechanism of a fundamental cognitive capability.
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Introduction
Humans and other animals exhibit a remarkable ability to flexibly
select an appropriate response to a sensory input, and rapidly
switch to another sensory-response mapping when task rule or
goal changes (Allport et al., 1994; Rogers and Monsell, 1995;
Meiran, 2000; Logan and Bundesen, 2003; Mayr and Kliegl, 2003;
Monsell, 2003; Koch and Allport, 2006; Altmann and Gray, 2008;
Gallagher, 2009; Klingberg, 2009; Collins and Frank, 2013). In
experiments designed to study task switching, typically a rule
indicates to a subject which feature of a given stimulus (e.g., color
or shape of a visual object) determines a correct response. Task
rule changes from trial to trial, or in blocks of trials, and sensory-
response mapping must switch accordingly. An increasing num-
ber of monkey experiments have been performed using task-
switching paradigms, combined with single-neuron recording
from sensory (Mirabella et al., 2007; Sasaki and Uka, 2009; Cohen
and Maunsell, 2011; Mante et al., 2013), parietal (Stoet and Sny-
der, 2004, 2007a; Kamigaki et al., 2009), and prefrontal (Man-
souri et al., 2006, 2007, 2009; Hussar and Pasternak, 2009; Mante
et al., 2013; Buschman et al., 2012; Wendelken et al., 2012) cor-
tical areas. Physiological evidence from these studies suggests that
modulation of neural activity by task rule is typically weak. By
contrast, most previous models commonly assume that a rule
signal is similarly strong as sensory stimulation in affecting activ-
ity of cortical neurons (Cohen et al., 1990; Rougier et al., 2005;
Brown et al., 2007). How can small rule modulation explain large
(binary) behavioral changes in task switching?
In this work, we propose a solution to this puzzle, which we
will refer to as “the tweaking hypothesis”. The basic idea is that
network reconfiguration underlying task switching can be real-
ized by very weak top-down signals from rule neurons. This is
because a weak input can be greatly amplified through reverber-
ating “attractor” dynamics in categorization and decision cir-
cuits, ultimately leading to circuit selection in favor of one
sensory-motor mapping over another. We tested the tweaking
hypothesis by developing a neural circuit model for task switch-
ing that consists of several basic and interacting circuit modules
for sensory coding, rule representation, categorization of stimulus
features, and action selection, respectively. The model was validated
by reproducing salient single-neuron physiological observations and
behavioral effects associated with task switching. Notably, the model
identifies specific circuit mechanisms with testable predictions, in
terms of neural dynamics and reward-dependent synaptic plasticity,
that explain salient and widely observed behavioral effects associated
with task switching: (1) Switch cost: response time (RT) and error
rate (ER) increase in trials following a task switch. Switch cost splits
into a component that decreases with a longer time for preparation
and a residual component that remains (Rogers and Monsell, 1995;
Brown et al., 2007; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). (2) Task-response
interaction: on task repeat trials RT is shorter if the same response is
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selected than if it is different; by contrast, the opposite trend holds on
switch trials (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Altmann,
2011). (3) Congruency effect: RTs and ER are larger when the stim-
ulus is incongruent than when it is congruent (depending on
whether the mapped behavioral response is different or the same
according to the two rules; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000;
Brown et al., 2007).
Materials and Methods
Simulation protocol. For concreteness, the model was designed for the
cued task-switching experiment of Mirabella et al. (2007) and Caselli and
Chelazzi (2011). In this experiment, a cue (circle or triangle) indicates
which of two features (color or shape, respectively) must be mapped to a
motor response. The two tasks are nearly symmetrical, in the sense that
neither feature is prepotent and the performance is similar for
orientation- and color-based behavior (Mirabella et al., 2007; Caselli and
Chelazzi, 2011). Each simulated trial (Fig. 1A) starts with a fixation pe-
riod (250 ms). One of the two alternative cue stimuli is then randomly
selected and presented for 250 ms, so the task can repeat or switch with
equal probability. A target is presented after a delay (cue-target interval;
CTI) of 1.75 s, although we also varied the delay to assess the dependence
of the switch cost on CTI (see Fig. 6 A, C). The target stimulus is a bar that
includes the two features (color and orientation). Feature values map to
one of the two alternative responses (left or right) according to a previ-
ously established sensory-motor association (Fig. 1B). A target stimulus
can be “congruent” or “incongruent” depending on whether its two
features point to the same response or to different responses, respec-
tively. The feature values are randomly selected between 0°, 45°, 90°, and
Figure 1. Neural circuit model for rule-based task switching. A, Cued task switch paradigm. At the beginning of a trial, a cue indicates the task to be performed (circle, color; triangle, orientation).
After a delay, a target stimulus (oriented color bar) is presented. A response (left or right) has to be selected as fast as possible. B, Sensory-motor association. Target features in each dimension are
classified into two categories that are mapped to opposite behavioral responses. Congruent (marked in white background) and incongruent (in gray) stimuli are defined based on whether the
mapped behavioral response is the same or different according to the two rules (e.g., the green stimulus oriented at 135° maps to either right or left if the task rule is color or orientation, respectively).
C, Model architecture with four interacting neural circuits that instantiate distinct cognitive processes: rule encoding, sensory processing, feature categorization, and action selection. The three
nonsensory (rule, category, action) modules are modeled similarly, endowed with attractor dynamics underlying winner-take-all competition. A rule neural pool maintains the task context in the
form of persistent activity, which can be switched to the other rule neural pool if instructed by a cue. Sensory cells independently process color and orientation features and receive top-down
attentional modulations from rule and category cells. Category cells group feature values into classes; they project to action cells that compete with each other and select a motor response. Action
cells display firing-rate adaptation (see Materials and Methods). The model is endowed with reward-dependent plasticity at recurrent synapses in the rule circuit and at feedforward synapses from
sensory to category cells and from category to action cells.
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135° for orientation; and red, blue, green, and yellow for color. Thus,
congruent and incongruent stimuli appear with same probability. The
response to a target have to be executed as fast as possible (with the only
exception of simulations for Fig. 3D, where we fixed the duration of the
target presentation to 1.5 s). In a trial, a response is produced when a
neural pool in the action selection module reaches the threshold level at
20 Hz. Once a decision is made, the target stimulus is removed, which is
followed by an intertrial interval of 500 ms before the following trial
begins. In a small number of trials (2%), the response was premature
(RT  250 ms) or no response was initiated during the target presenta-
tion. These trials were considered invalid and discarded.
Model architecture. The model includes four reciprocally interacting
neuronal circuits dedicated to distinct basic cognitive functions (Fig.
1C): sensory processing, rule encoding, feature categorization, and ac-
tion selection. The sensory module constitutes two separate networks
based on the evidence that color- and orientation-selective neurons are
largely segregated in the ventral pathway of visual cortex: color selective
domains in V4 have been identified in several electrophysiological (Zeki,
1973; Conway et al., 2007; Conway and Tsao, 2009; Harada et al., 2009)
and fMRI (Conway and Tsao, 2006; Conway et al., 2007; Harada et al.,
2009; Tanigawa et al., 2010) studies. Orientation-selective domains have
also been shown (Ghose and Ts’o, 1997). Interestingly, a recent study has
found that feature preference for color and orientation is segregated in
V4 bands (Tanigawa et al., 2010). This does not imply a complete segre-
gation of feature selectivity at a single-neuron level, but that the activity
of the local population is more pronounced toward color or orientation
representation (Tanigawa et al., 2010). Neural pools in our model repre-
sent averaged local activity. Thus, the selectivity of a pool of neurons
encoding (e.g., green) is assumed to represent all local neurons in a color
band that are selective to greenish colors, and in average not strongly
tuned to orientation. This argument similarly applies to orientation-
selective pools. Color is simplified to hue in the model, which can be
mapped to a one-dimensional periodic variable (Conway et al., 2007).
This allows us to use a ring implementation for each sensory network
(Ben-Yishai et al., 1995; Compte et al., 2000; Ardid et al., 2007). Sensory
circuits receive bottom-up inputs and are subject to top-down modula-
tions from rule and category cells.
Rule, categorization, and action selection modules are all assumed to
be attractor circuits (Wang, 2001, 2002; Wong and Wang, 2006). Note
that, for the sake of simplicity, we used different neural pools for color
categorization and orientation categorization. Category neurons for
color and orientation may well be part of a single and general categori-
zation system; indeed this is likely if category selectivity is formed
through learning, by virtue of plasticity of input synapses onto neurons
in such a categorization system (Engel and Wang, 2010). Attractor dy-
namics enables each module to integrate inputs over time, and generates
winner-take-all competition between the neural pools. Rule cells com-
pete to establish a proper context, which is maintained by self-sustained
persistent activity, although it can be reconfigured by a cue input. Based
on rule-biased sensory inputs, category cells determine through compe-
tition to which category the relevant target feature belongs. Action cells
receive inputs from category cells and produce the final behavioral
response.
Neuronal dynamics. We have used a reduced firing-rate implementa-
tion (Wong and Wang, 2006; Engel and Wang, 2011) of a spiking neural
network model (Compte et al., 2000; Brunel and Wang, 2001; Wang,
2001, 2002; Ardid et al., 2007). This simplification facilitates an efficient
exploration of parameters, and makes it computationally feasible to ex-
ecute a circuit model running thousands of consecutive trials, which is
required to analyze trial history effects in task switching. In this simpli-
fied model, inhibitory cells are only described implicitly, leading to effec-
tive inhibition between two selective neural pools. The neural dynamics




  s/s  1  sr,
where s  60 ms and   0.641. The firing rate r is given by a function of
total input I (Abbott and Chance, 2005):
r  f I 
aI  b
1  exp   daI  b
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the same input– output relationship
for rule, category and action selection neural pools, with a  518 Hz/nA,
b  208 Hz, and d  123 ms. For sensory circuits, the parameters are a 
272 Hz/nA, b  230 Hz, and d  21.2 ms. This modification increases the
exponent of the power-law f–I curve that has been proposed to approx-
imate multiplicative gain by attention in the sensory cortex (Ardid et al.,
2007). As a result, sensory neurons that receive stronger bottom-up input
are also more sensitive to top-down modulations (Ardid et al., 2007).
This is efficient for processing nonspecific top-down inputs, such the rule
signal.
The total input I consists of two terms: synaptic inputs between neural
pools in the model and external inputs.
Synaptic inputs. The synaptic input from neural population A to neural
population B is described by:
Isyn, j
A3B  iA gijA3B siA,
where gij
A3B is the synaptic strength between neuron i in population A and
neuron j in population B.
The rule circuit encodes two contexts that are represented by two
neural pools, color and orientation (Fig. 1C). Local connections are ex-
citatory g  0.158 nA for recurrent inputs, and inhibitory g  0.05 nA
from one pool to the other. The strong intrapool excitation and interpool
inhibition give rise to reverberatory attractor dynamics (Brunel and
Wang, 2001; Wang, 2001, 2002). Rule cells selectively project to the sen-
sory ( g  0.075 nA) and category ( g  0.001 nA) circuits.
Neurons in sensory modules are organized (Fig. 1C) by their preferred
stimulus feature i (from 0° to 180°). Populations for color and orienta-
tion features are both simulated by 64 equally distributed neural pools
(i	1  i  180°/64). Within each network, the synaptic strength gij
between neurons with preferred directions i and j presents a Gaussian
profile:
giji   j  g  g	 exp   i  j
2/2	2,
with 	  18°. Parameters g  1 nA, and g	  0.2 nA determine the
amount of recurrent global inhibition and local excitation in the circuit.
This strong global inhibition mediates divisive normalization (Heeger et
al., 1996; Carandini and Heeger, 2012) in sensory circuits (Ardid et al.,
2007).
The connectivity between sensory and category cells is shaped by
learning (Engel and Wang, 2010), which we do not model explicitly in
this work. We assume that the synaptic weight is a periodic sigmoid
function of the presynaptic feature , so for instance neurons selective to
feature values belonging to category C significantly contributed to it, but
barely to category D (Fig. 1C):
gij i  g/1  exp  cos 2i  0, j/	,
where i denotes sensory cells encoding a particular stimulus feature (e.g.,
orientation i) and j refers to each of the associated two categories (cat-
egories C and D in the example). The cosine function is introduced in the
sigmoid function to generate periodicity. Category boundaries are 67.5°
and 157.5°. 0,j represents the center within each category domain (22.5°
and 112.5°, respectively). 	 controls the slope of the sigmoid, so the lower
its value, the closer the curve is to the step function. We use 	  0.18, as
it generates a smooth but sharp categorical connectivity. g represents the
maximum strength and is equal to 0.07 nA from sensory to category cells,
and 0.2 nA from category to sensory cells.
Similarly to the rule circuit, circuits underlying categorization and
action planning also obey winner-take-all attractor dynamics, with
strong intrapool excitation ( g  0.17 nA, for the two circuits), and
interpool inhibition ( g  0.065 nA for the categorization circuit and
g  0.05 nA for the action selection circuit). Finally, category pools
selectively project to action pools ( g  0.075 nA; Fig. 1C).
In addition to synaptic inputs, action pools are subject to spike-rate
adaptation IA. The aim for introducing adaptation (and only in action
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pools) was to computationally test our proposed mechanism for the
task-response interaction: a particular combined effect of plasticity and
adaptation taking place in action cells (see Fig. 7C,D). Adaptation is
highly likely to happen in other modules, including for instance the
sensory circuits in this model; however, we explicitly avoided including
adaptation in the rest of our model for the sake of simplicity, as it is not
particularly implicated in any other task switching phenomena. We have
used a phenomenological implementation because our aim has been to
center on behavioral interactions rather than to capture the precise bio-
physical mechanism of response suppression in these cells. The dynamics
of the adaptation current was described by Wang et al. (2003) and Engel
and Wang (2011):
dIA/dt   IA/A  gAr,
where r represents the neuron’s firing rate, A  5 s, and gA  0.0015 nA.
Plastic synapses. The model is endowed with reward-dependent plas-
ticity under the assumption that reward information is used by the brain
to up- or down-regulate the relevance of competing task rules and
sensory-motor pathways, based on experience. However because of the
low amount of errors (5.6%), indistinguishable results were obtained in
the model with a non-reward-dependent, otherwise equivalent plasticity
rule. Plasticity in the model underlies the residual switch cost (plasticity
in recurrent synapses of the rule circuit) and stimulus priming effects
(plasticity in feedforward synapses from sensory to category cells and
from category to action cells). Plastic inputs add to the nonplastic syn-
aptic inputs described above. Each pair of pre- and postsynaptic cells is
connected by a set of bistable synapses that are in either a potentiated or
a depressed state (Fusi, 2002; Soltani and Wang, 2006; Engel and Wang,
2011). The fraction c of potentiated synapses quantifies the strength of
the plastic connection. Plastic synaptic strengths are expressed as gij  g 
cij. Parameter g represents the maximum strength and is equal to 0.02 nA
for recurrent synapses of the rule circuit, 0.01 nA for inputs from sensory
to category cells, and 0.011 nA for inputs from category to action cells.
All plastic synapses are updated according to a Hebbian plasticity rule
that is gated by reward (Soltani and Wang, 2006; Fusi et al., 2007; Engel
and Wang, 2011). Thus, synaptic changes occur only on rewarded trials
in our model. However, due to the low error rate (5.6%), results remain
the same when Hebbian plasticity is reversed in the absence of reward.
Plastic synapses are either potentiated or depressed at the end of the trial
depending on pre- and postsynaptic activities, computed by mean firing
rates within the interval 
t  50 ms, right before a response is selected.
Potentiation occurs when presynaptic and postsynaptic activities are
above a firing-rate threshold, otherwise the synaptic strength is de-
pressed. The firing-rate threshold for plasticity is chosen based on neu-
ronal activation relative to spontaneous activity. The threshold is 25 Hz
for sensory cells and 10 Hz for the rest. Potentiation is described as a transi-
tion of depressed synapses to the potentiated state: c3 c 	 q(1  c). Anal-
ogously, depression is described as the transition of potentiated synapses to
the depressed state: c3 c  q  c. q refers to the plasticity rate and is equal to
0.25 in both transitions.
External inputs. There are three different sources for external inputs:
the noisy current IN, the sensory input IS, and the reset input IR. IN
represents the background synaptic input to each circuit and obeys:
NdIN/dt   IN  Io  N	N
 t,
where N  2 ms and 
(t) represents a Gaussian white noise process with

(t)   0 and  
(t)
(t)  (t  t). Variance of background
noise is manipulated with 	N that is equal to 0.03 nA for sensory cells, and
0.013 nA for the rest. Mean input I0 is 0.369, 0.3, 0.367, and 0.355 nA
respectively for rule, sensory, category, and action cells.
IS refers to two sensory inputs that represent the cue and the target
stimuli. There are two alternative cue inputs. In each trial, one of the two
is randomly selected and specifically excites one pool of rule cells (IS 
0.0025 nA) and inhibits the other (IS  0.05 nA). This combination of
excitation and inhibition presumably involves balanced excitation and
inhibition through feedforward inhibition, which is not explicitly in-
cluded in the model. The target stimulus impacts on sensory neurons that
encode a particular target feature with the following Gaussian profile:
Is i  IM exp  S  i
2/2	S
2,
where the target feature is represented by S, i ranges the selectivity of
sensory cells encoding the feature (e.g., orientation), 	S  18° specifies
the width, and IM  0.07 nA is the maximum input current, input that
neurons encoding the stimulus feature S receive.
A reset input IR  0.25 nA is introduced right after a response is
selected. This inhibitory input lasts 500 ms and represents a corollary
discharge (Crapse and Sommer, 2008) that suppresses activity of cells
involved in decision making processing (action and category cells).
Computer simulations. For numerical simulations of the firing-rate
model, we used the Euler integration method with a time step of 1 ms.
Simulations were initialized with different random seeds and, unless
otherwise indicated, the model was run on n  2  10 4 consecutive trials.
The first 1000 trials were always discarded so that the results did not
depend on the initial conditions. In Figure 6B, the RT residual switch cost
for each q value was averaged from 100 different realizations to diminish
its variability. For analysis of trial history dependence (Fig. 8), the num-
ber of trials was increased to n  10 5, because three repetitions in a row
were unlikely events.
To evidence variability in the model, we ran n  100 realizations of a
same sequence of n  16 trials. Rule and target features in each trial of the
sequence were randomly selected in advance. To avoid any dependence
of the results on the initial conditions, each realization was initialized
with 100 randomly selected trials and random seed. The first 100 trials
were then discarded and only the sequence of 16 trials was kept for the
analysis shown in Figure 5 A, B.
Results
A neural circuit model for rule-based task switching
We have adapted a cued task-switching experiment designed by
Mirabella et al. (2007) and Caselli and Chelazzi (2011), which
provides behavioral and single-neuron data that has been used to
constrain our model. In this task (Fig. 1A), a cue is shown, indi-
cating whether the attended feature is color or orientation. The
target, a color oriented bar, appears after a delay (CTI), until a
behavioral response is selected (left vs right). Incongruent and
congruent targets (Fig. 1B) are defined depending on whether the
mapped behavioral response is different or the same based on the
two target features. Our model circuit consists of four neural
modules (Fig. 1C). In the sensory module, distinct neural popu-
lations encode color and orientation. Each population is de-
scribed by a continuous (or “ring”) circuit in which neurons are
selective for a stimulus feature as an analog quantity (Ben-Yishai
et al., 1995; Compte et al., 2000; Ardid et al., 2007). All the other
three modules are modeled similarly according to our previous
strongly recurrent network model (Brunel and Wang, 2001;
Wang, 2001, 2002; Wong and Wang, 2006), which is character-
ized by attractor dynamics underlying winner-take-all competition
among selective neural pools. In the category module, neurons can
discriminate color and orientation features (which are analog quan-
tities) into binary categories. In the rule module, distinct neural
pools compete to establish a proper context that is maintained by
persistent activity. Sensory cells are subject to top-down modulation
from both rule and category cells. Category neurons combine
bottom-up inputs from sensory cells and a weak top-down biasing
signal from rule cells to decide on the target feature category. This
information is sent to the action selection module, where one of the
competing neural pools (selective for left vs right) ultimately pro-
duces a motor response. See Material and Methods for a detailed
description of the model and simulation protocol.
Figure 2 shows how different modules in our model perform
different computations yet work cooperatively in task switching.
Two representative trials are shown: a switch trial with congruent
stimulus (Fig. 2, left), and a repeat trial with incongruent stimu-
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lus (Fig. 2, right). The rule in play is main-
tained by elevated persistent activity in
one of the two rule-selective neural pools,
say color rule cells (Fig. 2, top). In a switch
trial, a cue input is presented, leading to a
switch of persistent activity pattern (Fig.
2A), whereas in a repeat trial the cue input
barely changes the activity pattern (Fig.
2B).
The spatiotemporal activity pattern of
sensory neurons is shown for the two
sample trials in Figures 2C,D. A bar stim-
ulus activates a neural group in the color
coding network and another in the orien-
tation color network (with category
boundaries of each feature marked by
horizontal dashed lines). The model re-
produces two salient experimental obser-
vations. First, top-down modulation is
present but weak in the activity of neurons
that are selective to the relevant target fea-
ture (Fig. 2C, orientation neurons 45°;
D, color neurons encoding green show
slightly darker orange color indicative of
higher activity caused by top-down mod-
ulation; see also Fig. 3A). Second, top-
down modulation increases over time
notably on incongruent stimulation (Fig.
2D, darker orange color toward the end of
the trial; see also Fig. 3C), but not much
on the congruent condition (Figs. 2C, 3C;
Mirabella et al., 2007). This effect is ex-
plained in the model by the time course of
activity of category-selective neurons that
is much more pronounced in incongruent
trials (Figs. 2F, 3B) than in congruent tri-
als (Figs. 2E, 3B), leading to a buildup of
modulation of sensory neurons by cate-
gory cells on the incongruent condition.
The model assumes that there is
competition between all four category-
selective neural pools, which ultimately
leads to a single winner (“selected cate-
gory”). In a congruent trial (Fig. 2, left),
selecting the relevant category is not es-
sential, because the two activated category
pools (B: color-right and D: orientation-
right) in Figure 2E project to the same ac-
tion pool (Fig. 2G). In contrast, in an
incongruent trial (Fig. 2, right), the two
activated category pools (B: color-right,
C: orientation-left) in Figure 2F send in-
puts to conflicting action pools. The two category neural pools
compete with each other, but only the relevant category is slightly
favored by a small modulation from rule cells. Once a category
neural pool wins the competition, its associated action pool
ramps up, and a response is triggered at the time its activity
crosses 20 Hz (Fig. 2H).
It is known that V4 neuronal responses are modestly modu-
lated by selective attention (Moran and Desimone, 1985; McAd-
ams and Maunsell, 2000; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Maunsell
and Treue, 2006). Experimental observations (Mirabella et al.,
2007; Cohen and Maunsell, 2011) suggest that selective attention
can be extended to rule-based attention (e.g., orientation vs
color) and feature categorization (e.g., Category 1 vs Category 2),
in addition to feature value (e.g., red vs green). In our model, rule
neurons provide a weak top-down biasing signal, consistent with
the rule-based attentional modulation observed in V4 neurons
already during CTI, before the target presentation (Mirabella et
al., 2007). To quantify modulation in sensory neurons in our
model, we define a “modulation ratio” as the ratio between the
activity of the sensory pool that processes the cued relevant fea-
ture and that of the sensory pool that processes the other (irrele-
vant) target feature. The attentional modulation for sensory
Figure 2. Neural activity in the model. A, B, The rule in play is represented by elevated persistent activity in one of the two
rule-selective neural pools. A, A switch trial. Persistent activity is switched from color-selective neural pool (orange) to orientation-
selective neural pool (gray) by a cue signal. Note the slow time course of the switching dynamics that gives rise to the preparatory
switch cost. B, A repeat trial. Persistent activity remains in the color-selective neural pool. Its activity barely changes with the cue
input. C, D, Spatiotemporal activity pattern of sensory neurons labeled by their preferred feature ( y-axis). Firing rate is color-
coded. Dashed vertical black lines: RT from target onset to response. Dashed white horizontal lines: category boundaries. C, With a
congruent target stimulus (green bar oriented 45°), orientation- and color-selective sensory cells point to the same action. Rele-
vant pools (neurons selective for 45° orientation) are slightly enhanced by attentional inputs. D, With an incongruent target
stimulus (green bar oriented 135°), orientation- and color-selective sensory cells point to opposite actions. Relevant pools (neurons
selective for green color) are enhanced by attentional inputs. E, F, Category cells increase their activity after target onset. Rule cells
bias the competition in the category circuit so eventually one category neural pool wins the competition (D category cell in blue that
represents orientation-right, in E; B category cell in purple, that represents color-right, in F ). G, H, Activity of action cells. With a
congruent stimulus G, the activity of right-selective neurons (in blue) grows immediately after the target onset, while the activity
for left-selective neurons (in red) rapidly decreases. In contrast, with an incongruent stimulus H, activities of the two competing
action-selective neural pools remain approximately the same until one of the category neural pools wins the competition. The
activity of the corresponding action pool (right response in blue) ramps up very quickly at that moment.
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neurons before target onset is indeed modest (10% increase of
spontaneous activity that corresponds to a modulation ratio of
1.1, Fig. 3A). Interestingly, our model predicts that reward-
dependent plasticity in the rule circuit affects this modulation,
due to the activation of rule pools that have been previously
reinforced (task repetition) or weakened (task switch) by
reward-dependent plasticity in recurrent synapses. Thus, this
modulation is higher for a repeat trial compared with a switch
trial (Fig. 3A).
Activity of V4 neurons is also influenced by behaviorally rel-
evant category signals during target presentation (Mirabella et al.,
2007). The signal may reflect top-down input from category neu-
rons in downstream regions (Mirabella et al., 2007), such as pre-
frontal cortex (PFC; Freedman et al., 2003; Cromer et al., 2010;
Roy et al., 2010) or lateral intraparietal area (LIP; Freedman and
Assad, 2006; Fitzgerald et al., 2011). In agreement with neural
data (Mirabella et al., 2007), the attentional modulation in sen-
sory neurons modestly increases through the target presentation
(from 10 to 20%), and more significantly under the incon-
gruent (magenta) compared with the
congruent (green) condition (10% dif-
ference; Fig. 3C). This difference may be
explained either because dynamics in the
category circuit depends on stimulus con-
gruency, or due to different RTs for the
two stimulus conditions. To test this, we
ran a set of simulations using a fixed du-
ration (1.5 s) for the target presentation,
which revealed that the effect is indepen-
dent of stimulus condition (Fig. 3D, inset)
and solely because category cells ramp up
for a longer time and to a higher level in
incongruent trials (Fig. 3D).
The source of the category signal in the
model is originated from the attractor
dynamics in the category circuit. To illus-
trate its dynamics, we repeated the analy-
sis of the modulation ratio for category
neurons (Fig. 3B). As of sensory neurons,
category neurons also receive a moderate
top-down input from rule neurons that
slightly enhances the low spontaneous ac-
tivity before target onset by 35% (from
2.4 to 3.2 Hz), which is barely distin-
guishable from activity fluctuations (Fig.
2E,F), unless averaged through many tri-
als (Fig. 3B). This modulation is not
enough to trigger the winner-take-all
competition in the attractor network. It
only becomes fully visible in conjunction
with the bottom-up sensory input when
the target stimulus is presented (Fig. 3B).
This mechanism is what we call the tweak-
ing hypothesis for executive control: a
weak rule bias that is able to efficiently
reconfigure the sensory-motor mapping
based on context. Attentional modulation
to both sensory and category neurons is
biologically plausible (30%; Fig. 3), yet
sufficient to properly bias the winner-
take-all competition in the category cir-
cuit during target presentation.
Our model identifies a new mecha-
nism for resolving conflicts caused by incongruent stimulation
between competing sensory features that are equally salient: a
category circuit, at an intermediate stage between sensory pro-
cessing and action selection, that is endowed with winner-take-all
competition. First, such implementation accounts for modest
attentional modulations of sensory neurons (an increase in activ-
ity from 40 to 50 Hz; Fig. 2C,D). Second, both types of stim-
ulus (congruent and incongruent) equally project to competing
category pools. The symmetry between the two activated category
pools is only broken by the rule modulation, or from stimulus
priming (an implicit memory effect that influences behavioral
responses under stimulus repetition, see Material and Methods).
Thus, the congruency effect is limited only to the readout of
category inputs in the action circuit: whether the two competing
categories project to a same action pool or not.
To shed insights into the tweaking principle, we compare
three simplified versions of the model that only differ in the dy-
namics of the category circuit (Fig. 4). The first version of the
Figure 3. Task switching is routed by weak top-down modulation. A, Modulation ratio between sensory circuits relative to the
target onset. The modulation ratio is defined as the ratio of the activity of neurons selective for the relevant target feature and that
of neurons selective for the irrelevant feature. The modulation ratio deviates from 1 (by 10%) before the target onset (CTI),
which is explained by weak top-down inputs originated at the rule circuit. The rule bias is significantly higher after a single task
repeat (red) compared with switch (black). B, Modulation ratio between category pools. The relevant category pool receives a small
top-down input from rule neurons that barely enhances its activity before target onset. This weak modulation is not enough to
trigger winner-take-all competition in the category circuit. However, it acts in conjunction with the bottom-up sensory input to
bias the winner-take-all competition during target presentation. Once the attractor dynamics is triggered, the modulation ratio
ramps up very fast. The different modulation ratio that is reached between congruent (green) and incongruent (magenta) condi-
tions is due to shorter RTs on the congruent condition. C, Modulation ratio between sensory circuits relative to response. The
modulation ratio increases during the target period toward the behavioral response due to moderate top-down inputs from
category cells (from 10 to 20% modulation, averaging both conditions together). This modulation is higher under the
incongruent condition (30%, magenta) relative to the congruent condition (15%, green). D, Fixed duration task. The task
design was modified, so that the behavioral response occurs after a fixed-target duration of 1.5 s. This allowed us to prove that the
categorical modulation is the same for the congruent and incongruent conditions (inset). The same traces from inset panel are
replotted in main panel but aligned by the average RT of the respective stimulus condition. The overlap between these traces and
those from the middle panel proves that the different modulation ratio between conditions is only due to a difference in RT.
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model consists of a category circuit that linearly summates their
inputs, IF (for each of two stimulus features) and IR (for rule bias;
Fig. 4A). In the action selection circuit, the neural pool selective
for the relevant action receives an input I  2  IF 	 IR on the
congruent condition, and the other neural pool receives no input;
the difference of the two inputs (which determines the ultimate
motor response; Wang, 2002) is 
I  2  IF 	 IR. By contrast, on
the incongruent condition, the inputs for the two neural pools are
I  IF 	 IR and I  IF; the difference is 
I  IR. In order for the
congruency (or conflict) effect to be small, the input difference
must be similar under the two conditions. This is possible only if
IR is much larger than IF, which is not biologically realistic.
The second version of the model relies on divisive normaliza-
tion (Heeger et al., 1996; Carandini and Heeger, 2012). In this
case, activity of category neurons is normalized in proportion to
the total input that the category circuit receives, 2  IF 	 IR (Fig.
4B). This means that, in the action selection circuit, the neural
pool selective for the relevant action on the congruent condition
receives an input I 
IF  IR
2  IF  IR

IF
2  IIF 	 IR
, and the
other pool receives zero input. On the incongruent condition
each action pool receives
IF  IR
2  IF  IR
or
IF




2  IF  IR
. Even for IR  IF, the input difference
on the incongruent condition is still much smaller (
I  1/3)
than in the congruent case (
I  1), therefore the congruency
effect predicted by the model remains much larger than that ob-
served experimentally. Although divisive normalization is pro-
posed to increase sensitivity (Carandini and Heeger, 2012) by
scaling inputs to a particular interval, which may as well contrib-
ute to enhance stability, it is not capable of resolving conflicting
inputs in task switching.
The third version of the model assumes a winner-take-all
mechanism as in our model. The mechanism is based on attractor
dynamics in the category circuit endowed with two important
properties: a strong input (IF) is needed, but only the input dif-
ference (IR) is amplified. The output IL from the category pool
that does not win the competition becomes almost negligible
(IF 3 IL) compared with the output IH from the category pool
that wins the competition (IF 	 IR3 IH), even for a weak rule bias
and in both the congruent and incongruent conditions (Fig. 4C).
The congruency effect is explained at the level of the action cir-
cuit. On the congruent condition, the neural pool selective for the
relevant action receives a total input of I  IH 	 IL, and the other
receives no input; whereas on the incongruent condition, the
relevant action pool receives I  IH and the other pool receives
I  IL. The input difference between the two pools is 
I  IH 	 IL
for the congruent condition and 
I  IH  IL for the incongruent
condition. Because IL is much smaller than IH, the input differ-
ence is very similar in the two cases, and the congruency effect
stays modest.
This simplified analysis provides an intuitive explanation of
how our proposed mechanism, based on the tweaking principle,
resolves the conflict and reproduces the congruency effect ob-
served in behavior (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000;
Brown et al., 2007). Also in this regime, a conflict monitor, sug-
gested to modestly enhance the task rule bias (IR) under demand-
ing or conflicting situations (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick,
2007; Brown et al., 2007), is especially suited for affecting behav-
ior (Fig. 7A).
Figure 4. Schematic models for explaining a modest congruency effect in the task
switching model. The three scenarios differ only in the assumed dynamics of the category
circuit. A, A category circuit that operates by linear summation. The stimulus input (IF) and
rule bias (IR) add together linearly in the category pools. B, A category circuit endowed
with divisive normalization. Category neural pools are normalized in proportion to the
total input received by the circuit. C, A category circuit in winner-take-all regime. The
stimulus input (IF) is sufficiently strong to trigger attractor dynamics in the category
circuit. In that regime, recurrent excitation and lateral inhibition work together, so that
only the input difference (IR) is amplified. The third, but not the first or second, scenario
gives rise to a modest congruency effect as observed experimentally, under the assump-
tion that top-down rule signaling is much weaker than sensory stimulation. For detailed
explanation, please see the Results section.
19510 • J. Neurosci., December 11, 2013 • 33(50):19504 –19517 Ardid and Wang • A Tweaking Principle Model for Executive Control
From neural data to behavior
Neural fluctuations in our model give rise to high variability
of RTs (Fig. 5A) and ER (Fig. 5B; overall ER  5.6%). How-
ever, correct trials present systematically shorter RTs compared
with error trials (mean RT: 606.45 ms and 838.88 ms, respec-
tively; p  0.001 Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test; Fig. 5C). In
perceptual decision-making (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Wang,
2008; Luce, 2009), when the signal-to-noise is low, RTs are longer
and ER is higher. We found that the same principle applies to task
switching on the incongruent condition, except that the signal
does not merely reflect the quality of external sensory informa-
tion, but the relative input difference between the alternative
action pools, which is determined by the stochastic dynamics of
rule cells, and the strength of their top-down inputs.
For correct trials, we analyzed the RT distributions under dif-
ferent conditions of stimulus congruency, task rule, behavioral
response, and feature priming. RT is lon-
ger for incongruent than for congruent
stimuli (mean RT: 663.73 ms and 555.94
ms, respectively; p  0.001 Mann–Whit-
ney–Wilcoxon test; Fig. 5D). The differ-
ence represents the congruency effect
(Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000;
Brown et al., 2007). Difference in RTs be-
tween switch versus repeat trials repre-
sents the switch cost (mean RT: 620.03 ms
and 593.41 ms, respectively; p  0.001
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test; Fig. 5E).
Given the large delay used in these simu-
lations (CTI  1.75 s), this switch cost
mostly reflects its residual component
(Monsell, 2003). The effect emerges from
the activation of rule pools that have been
previously reinforced (repetition) or
weakened (switch) by reward-dependent
plasticity in recurrent synapses. RT distri-
butions for same versus different behav-
ioral response, and same (primed) versus
different (not primed) target feature, are
not distinguishable (data not shown).
Proportion of errors under different con-
ditions of congruency, task, response, and
priming is shown in Figure 5F. Perfor-
mance is mostly impaired on incongruent
stimuli, on switch trials and on response
alternation, which significance is con-
firmed by logistic regression analysis (p 
0.001).
To assess the switch cost as a function
of preparation time between the cue and
target stimulus, we varied CTI from 0 s to
3.75 s, and found two components in the
RT switch cost (Fig. 6A). In the model, the
preparatory component of the switch cost
(Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Brown et al.,
2007; Vandierendonck et al., 2010) results
from attractor dynamics in the rule circuit
(Fig. 2, top). The rule is actively main-
tained from one trial to the next by the
activity of a rule-selective neural pool. We
designed the rule circuit in this way based
on the evidence of sustained rule-selective
activity in PFC across trials (Mansouri et
al., 2006; Durstewitz et al., 2010; Yamada et al., 2010). On a switch
trial, rule updating requires a transition between two different
attractor states, its time course then gives rise to the preparatory
cost, but this cost is not reflected in the RT for sufficiently long
CTIs (Fig. 6A). The residual component is the asymptote of
switch cost for long CTIs and indicates that there is part of the
cost that cannot be avoided even after long time for preparation.
In the model, neural interactions are modulated by reward-
dependent synaptic plasticity: on correct trials, activated path-
ways are facilitated through long-term potentiation (LTP) and
inactivated pathways get depressed through long-term depres-
sion. On repeat trials this reinforcement leads to behavioral me-
lioration, but on switch trials depressed pathways become
relevant and compete with facilitated pathways, leading to the
residual switch cost that remains for arbitrarily long CTIs (Fig.
6A). Figure 6B shows that the magnitude of the residual switch
Figure 5. Task switching accuracy and RT distributions in the model. A, B, Stochastic behavior. A, RT varies across a sequence of
16 trials due to two factors: intrinsic stochasticity in the model (five realizations are shown in colored thin lines), and trial
conditions, e.g., congruent versus incongruent stimulus or rule repeat versus switch (black thick line: averaged RT over 100
realizations). B, ER for each trial in the sequence computed across the 100 realizations. Fluctuations in ER reflect changes in trial
condition. C, RT distributions in correct and error trials. Mean RT values are indicated by colored triangles. RT distribution for error
trials is magnified 20 for better comparison. RTs for error trials are significantly longer compared with correct trials. The error rate
is 5.6%. D, RT distributions for congruent and incongruent trials. Only correct trials are included. The mean RT is larger with
incongruent stimuli (the congruency effect). E, RT distributions for rule repeat and switch. Only correct trials are included. Given the
long CTI  1.75 s in these trials, the difference in mean RTs represents the residual switch cost. F, ER under different conditions of
stimulus congruency, task rule, behavioral response, and feature priming. The proportion of error trials is sensitive to the congru-
ency effect, rule switch and response alternation, but not to feature priming.
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cost in the model clearly depends on a sufficiently high learning
rate q in the plasticity rule (see Materials and Methods). Impor-
tantly, a difference in the strength of the learning rate could un-
derlie across species (human–monkey) differences in the
magnitude of the residual switch cost. Monkeys learn more
slowly than humans and present lower residual switch costs
(Stoet and Snyder, 2007b). A lower plasticity rate implies slower
learning and, according to our model, reduces the magnitude of
the residual switch costs. Similarly to the RT, ER also decreases
with longer time for preparation, but even after long time, part of
ER switch cost is asymptotically not zero (Fig. 6C).
We then examined whether task rule interacts with behavioral
response, stimulus congruency or feature priming. Figure 6D
shows the task-response interaction. The model captures an
intriguing effect commonly observed in humans (Rogers and
Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Altmann, 2011): RT switch cost
increases on response repetition, so selecting the same behavioral
response shortens RT under rule repeat, but lengthens RT under
rule switch. The interaction is explained in the model by a com-
bination of two counteracting factors. On the one hand, a same
response under rule repeat requires activation of a category-to-
action pathway that has been facilitated through reward-
dependent plasticity, which shortens RT. On the other hand,
response repetition leads to intrinsic adaptation in action cells,
which makes RT longer. The combination of the two effects ex-
plains the task-response interaction, under the condition that the
benefit from plasticity overcomes the effect of adaptation (Fig.
7C,D).
The RT switch cost is longer for incongruent stimuli than for
congruent stimuli (Fig. 6E), as observed experimentally (Gos-
chke, 2000; Meiran, 2000; Liston et al., 2006; Wendelken et al.,
2012). In the model, this is because activated category pools co-
operate on congruent stimuli leading to faster responses, so that
the role of the rule bias is less important. The model also accounts
for an interaction between task rule and feature priming (Koch
and Allport, 2006; Fig. 6F). A bias from feature repetition on
consecutive trials is caused by plasticity at synapses from sensory
cells to category cells. The feature bias explains why RT is shorter
in a given trial if the relevant feature was also relevant in the
previous trial, compared with the case in which that feature did
not appear (positive priming). To control that this is indeed a
genuine effect of feature priming, our analysis considered only
trials where dissimilar features belonged to a same category.
Thus, rule, category, and response were fixed in consecutive tri-
als, whereas the target feature might repeat or change. In addi-
tion, the feature bias is responsible for an increased RT when a
feature was relevant in the previous trial but becomes thereafter
irrelevant (negative priming).
We tested statistical significance of RT differences across
conditions with a N-way ANOVA analysis. In advance, we log-
transformed RT distributions to accommodate normality limita-
tions of the ANOVA analysis. Among main factors (task rule,
Figure 6. Switch cost and task switching interactions in the model. A, RT switch cost. The cost is computed as the difference in RT between switch and repeat trials. The difference is displayed as
a function of time interval between cue and target stimuli (CTI). The total switch cost consists of two components: a preparatory component that decays with CTI, and a residual component that
represents the asymptotic level for long CTIs. Error bars represent SE. B, The magnitude of the residual switch cost depends on the plasticity rate q (see Materials and Methods). Dots represent
averaged residual switch costs over 100 different realizations. The reference value (q  0.25) is indicated by a circle. Data were fitted with an exponential function to guide eye inspection. C, ER
switch cost. A similar temporal profile to the RT switch cost is observed in the ER difference between switch and repeat trials. D, Task-response interaction. Response repetition emphasizes the impact
of the switch cost: RT is shorter for repeat trials, but it gets longer for switch trials. E, Task-congruency interaction. Difference in RTs between repeat vs switch trials is increased on incongruent
compared with congruent condition. F, Task-priming interaction. RT is shorter if the presently relevant feature was also relevant in the previous trial, compared with the case that it did not appear
(positive priming). The trend is the opposite if the feature was relevant in the previous trial, but becomes irrelevant in the current trial (negative priming).
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stimulus congruency, behavioral response, and stimulus prim-
ing), only stimulus congruency and task rule reached significance
(p  0.001). In addition, interactions between task rule and be-
havioral response, and task rule and feature priming also reached
significance (p  0.001 and p  0.0014, respectively). However,
the ANOVA analysis on log-transformed RT distributions clari-
fied that the apparent interaction between stimulus congruency
and task rule (Fig. 6E) did not reach significance, a prediction
from the model that could be tested experimentally by applying
the same log-transformation to data from other studies (Gos-
chke, 2000; Meiran, 2000; Liston et al., 2006; Wendelken et al.,
2012). Regarding ER, once interactions were taken into account
in the logistic regression analysis, only stimulus congruency and
behavioral response reached significance as main factors (p 
0.001), and in addition, the interaction between task and congru-
ency also became significant (p  0.001). This analysis confirmed
that errors predominantly occur with incongruent stimuli, and
more so if the rule switched or the response changed (Fig. 5F).
Neuronal mechanisms underlying task
switching observations
To better illustrate the neuronal processes underlying task
switching behavior in the model, we varied the strength of each
specific neuronal mechanism (such as the synaptic weight of top-
down signaling from rule cells, and so on) by a multiplicative
factor ( gnorm) between 0 and 1.5. Figure 7A shows that the rule
bias to sensory and category cells has an impact on the congru-
ency effect, which is parametrically reduced with stronger activa-
tion of the rule bias. This effect is due to a higher sensitivity of the
incongruent condition to the rule bias. The residual switch cost is
caused by plasticity in recurrent inputs of
rule cells and Figure 7B proves that the
higher its synaptic strength, the stronger
the recurrent input on rule repeat com-
pared with switch, and the higher the re-
sidual cost. Note that even when plastic
synapses in the rule circuit are inactivated,
part of the residual switch cost remains
(10 ms). This is due to plastic synapses
in bottom-up inputs underlying priming
effects in the model. The task-response in-
teraction depends on two counteracting
mechanisms: the plastic synapses at
bottom-up inputs (from sensory to cate-
gory cells and from category to action
cells) and the intrinsic adaptation in ac-
tion cells. When plastic synapses are ab-
sent, there is a response repetition cost
under task repeat because of firing-rate
adaptation in action cells, but this pattern
is reduced and eventually reversed with
stronger plastic connections (Fig. 7C). On
the other hand, if adaptation is absent, no
significant response repetition cost is
found under task switch. Only when ad-
aptation scales up, an increased switch
cost by response repetition appears (Fig.
7D). Alternatively, Figure 7 can be ex-
plained by the fact that the different task
switching effects in the model are highly
robust with respect to changes (up to
50%) in the parameters of the model.
A recent study has found that task
switching affects behavior beyond a single trial (Brown et al.,
2007). We suggest that this is indicative of a graded plastic process
rather than a bistable switch and our model is originally built
under such assumption: we use a plasticity rate (q  0.25), which
maintains memory traces in plastic synapses during few consec-
utive trials. As a result, neural mechanisms in which plasticity is
involved accumulate their effect on RTs and ER under successive
presentations. In the analysis, we consider subsets of trials with
1–3 repetitions of a given task rule, relevant category or relevant
stimulus feature. Results show that increasing the number of rep-
etitions, RTs become progressively shorter (Fig. 8A). However,
RTs increase if the previously relevant category, or relevant stim-
ulus feature, is still present after a rule switch (Fig. 8A). The
explanation is simple: activated pathways have been potentiated
through LTP for the previous 1, 2, or 3 trials but this pathway
becomes irrelevant in the current trial because the rule has
switched. Similar patterns are observed for ER (Fig. 8B): lower ER
occurs if a relevant condition repeats, but ER increases when such
a condition is concomitant with a rule switch, which is indicative
of increased behavioral perseveration.
Discussion
Humans are excellent at resolving conflicting sources of informa-
tion and at adapting to new contexts (Sakai, 2008). Congruency
and switch costs associated with task switching are typically
rather modest (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Brown
et al., 2007; Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Zylberberg et al., 2010).
Based on the results we presented, we suggest that the tweaking
principle may be an efficient mechanism used by the brain to
resolve sensory-motor conflicts in task switching. Our approach
Figure 7. Gradual dependence of task switching behavior on model parameters. The strength of each neural mechanism is
parametrically varied with a multiplicative factor gnorm in (0, 1.5), the reference value (with gnorm  1) is indicated by an orange
circle. Data were fitted with exponential functions to guide eye inspection. Error bars represent SE. A, Rule modulation. Congruent
and incongruent conditions are affected by rule bias, but the incongruent condition (magenta) is more sensitive. The congruency
effect is parametrically reduced with a stronger top-down input from the rule circuit to the sensory and the category circuits
(middle, RT cost; bottom, ER cost). B, Residual switch cost is enhanced by an increase in the strength of plastic synapses in the rule
circuit. C, Task-response interaction depends on plastic synapses from sensory to category cells and from category to action cells.
When they are absent, adaptation in action cells leads to longer RTs on response repetition under task repeat, but this effect is
reduced and eventually reversed with sufficiently strong plastic connections. D, Adaptation in action cells. When adaptation is
absent, no increase in the RT switch cost is found on response repetition. Only when adaptation scales up, a significant increase
appears.
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builds on four basic cognitive functions
and our model computationally captures
the properties and the dynamics of the im-
plicated neural circuits: rule selectivity in
PFC, sensory processing in V4, feature
categorization (and we predict conflict
resolution) in PFC/LIP, and action selec-
tion in premotor neurons. Compared
with more abstract models (Cohen et al.,
1990; Gilbert and Shallice, 2002; Morton
and Munakata, 2002), our biologically re-
alistic model is capable of reproducing
single-neuron activity associated with task
switching, and sheds insights into its un-
derlying circuit mechanism. At a concep-
tual level, previous models assumed that
top-down bias by task rule is powerful
(twice as strong as bottom-up sensory in-
puts in Cohen et al., 1990). By contrast, in
our model the rule bias modulates neuro-
nal activity in the sensory and category
circuits only modestly; but this small sig-
nal is highly amplified through strongly
recurrent dynamics in local circuits, lead-
ing to a complete rerouting of informa-
tion (by reconfiguring the sensory-motor mapping) that
underlies task switching.
Our model identifies potential neural correlates for task
switching behavior: first, the model assumes strongly recurrent
neural dynamics for decision making (Wang, 2002) and to main-
tain the rule in play in working memory (Amit, 1995; Wang,
2001). Behaviorally, internal maintenance in working memory of
behavioral rules is particularly relevant for the preparatory switch
cost. Attractor dynamics has been used before in task-switching
models (Rougier et al., 2005), but only for the internal mainte-
nance of rule representation and not for amplification of a weak
rule bias. Therefore, the present model is the first to propose the
tweaking principle and implement it by strong neural reverbera-
tion: attractor dynamics is essential in the category circuit to
optimally resolve the sensory-motor conflict in a way that is con-
sistent with the congruency effect observed behaviorally (Rogers
and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Brown et al., 2007). Second, the
model quantitatively accounts for the strength and time course of
the top-down attentional modulations from rule- and category-
selective neurons observed in sensory neurons (Mirabella et al.,
2007). These modulations enhance the processing of the behav-
iorally relevant information already in the sensory cortex. Third,
our model employs reward-dependent Hebbian learning for po-
tentiating the pathways in use and for depressing those that are
inactive. Hebbian synaptic plasticity in the model underpins
residual switch cost and priming effects, as well as it contrib-
utes to the task-response interaction.
It has been proposed that rule-based flexible behavior gener-
ally requires neurons with mixed selectivity for a combination of
task relevant information, such as stimulus, rule, and response
(Rigotti et al., 2010), and this proposal has recently received ex-
perimental support (Rigotti et al., 2013). Our model also contains
neurons with mixed selectivity; in particular, category selective
neurons are sensitive to both sensory inputs and rule signals,
although we implemented them through a structured hierarchi-
cal organization rather than using randomly connected neurons
(RCNs; Rigotti et al., 2010). Another difference is that here we used
reward-dependent plasticity as a plausible reinforcement learning
mechanism, whereas Rigotti et al. (2010) set the network connectiv-
ity through supervised learning using a perceptron algorithm. There
is no reason to believe that using RCNs would alter our conclusion in
support of the tweaking principle, which is the focus of the present
work. Our tweaking principle should be applied to a more general
framework, possibly endowed with RCNs, that is not specially de-
signed for a particular task but capable of adaptive coding (Duncan,
2001) to flexibly perform a number of decision tasks.
Furthermore, rule representation could also involve rhythmic
coordinated activity in neuronal subnetworks (Womelsdorf et
al., 2013). A recent work found that subgroups of cells in the PFC
show task-rule selective beta band synchronization (Buschman et
al., 2012). Such oscillatory dynamics may contribute to the for-
mation of a selective cell assembly for task rule representation in
a flexible manner. Interestingly, it has recently been shown that
beta synchrony and firing-rate modulation are very closely re-
lated to each other (Canolty et al., 2012). The role of oscillation in
a rule representation circuit can be investigated computationally
in the future by extending our model with the incorporation of
beta band synchrony.
Categorization plays an important role in the model. In general,
categorization represents a key computational step because it is the
basis to generalize sensory-motor associations on features that have
not been presented yet (Seger and Miller, 2010). Moreover, if a cat-
egory is primed from experience, this priming effectively impacts on
all its constitutive features. Therefore, categorization does not only
support the capability of generalizing but also the ability to efficiently
process novel features, and our model uses these properties. In ad-
dition to that, our model proposes a dynamical regime for the cate-
gory circuit, in the context of the tweaking principle that is key to
resolve conflicts. It may be argued that this mechanism fails when
task rules are not evident, or during early stages of practice because
behaviorally relevant categories are supposed to appear after train-
ing. Interestingly, it has been shown that even without explicit
knowledge of rules, learning task-related feature categories may be
inferred from practice (Dreisbach et al., 2006). On the other hand,
we suggest that in the course of training, category cells may be first
selective to stimulus features, and later through practice their selec-
Figure 8. RT and performance are sensitive to trial history. A, Memory in RTs across trials. Task-switching effects accumulate
through consecutive trials. The timescale is controlled by the learning rate (q  0.25) of plastic synapses (corresponding to a
timescale of  1/q  4 trials). We analyzed subsets of trials with 1, 2, and 3 repetitions of a given task rule, relevant category, or
relevant stimulus feature. Progressively shorter RTs (compared with control, shown in orange) appear for successive repetitions
that are relevant. However, if category or feature repetitions occur under rule switch, RTs become longer. Error bars represent SE.
B, Memory in ER across trials. Similarly, lower ER appears for relevant repetitions, but ER is higher when a repeated category or
stimulus feature becomes irrelevant, which represents increased behavioral perseveration.
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tivity evolves to categories. Under this assumption, the mechanism
for sensory-conflict resolution remains valid if attractor dynamics in
category cells emerges at the time of their initial feature selectivity.
The fact that category cells display highly adaptable selectivity in LIP
(Freedman and Assad, 2006; Fitzgerald et al., 2011) and PFC (Cro-
mer et al., 2010; Roy et al., 2010) supports this hypothesis. Note that
categorization of a stimulus attribute is generally independent of any
motor response. In any particular experimental paradigm, subjects
are required to learn a particular mapping between categories and
motor responses, as modeled in the present study. However, such
mapping can be arbitrary and our work can readily be extended by
incorporating learning of such arbitrary mapping as we have done in
a previous work (Fusi et al., 2007).
Our model presents a limitation, it has been designed for cued
tasks in which the processing of different stimulus features (e.g.,
color and orientation) is behaviorally similar, as measured by
response times and error rates. Previously described mechanisms
are then generic for near-symmetric cued tasks, and applicable to
other designs different than color versus orientation, as for in-
stance the letter versus digit paradigm, used in human studies
(Brown et al., 2007). However, in some task designs, the process-
ing of one feature is prepotent (e.g., when the word “red” is
printed in blue ink, the name red prevails over the color blue,
which is known as the Stroop effect; Stroop, 1935; Besner et al.,
1997). We believe that extending our model to such asymmetrical
tasks will not be difficult, with two additional ingredients: (1) to
assume asymmetrical pathway strengths for the two stimulus at-
tributes, the prepotent one is significantly stronger than the oth-
er; (2) to include a module for response inhibitory control (Logan
and Cowan, 1984; Boucher et al., 2007; Lo et al., 2009), which is
required to suppress a prepotent response when inappropriate.
Our model has a number of testable predictions, both in be-
havior and in physiology. First, under incongruent stimulation,
the winner-take-all dynamics in the category circuit and response
selection take place serially, so that the former needs to be com-
pleted before the latter begins. This result can be tested in cued
task switching paradigms by recording category neurons in LIP/
PFC and action selection neurons in premotor areas. Second,
long-term plasticity underlying residual cost may be tested be-
haviorally by systematically increasing the CTI and the intertrial
interval. If the residual cost disappears for sufficiently long inter-
vals, this would imply that the residual switch cost is not truly
independent of CTI but originates from a slowly decaying pro-
cess. However, two studies have shown significant residual costs
after preparatory times longer than 5 s (Kimberg et al., 2000;
Sohn et al., 2000). Physiologically, a prediction from the model is
that plasticity in rule cells generates stronger rule modulation on
sensory cells even after a single task repetition. In support of this
idea, it has been recently shown that dopaminergic receptor ac-
tivation in prefrontal neurons modulates the amplitude of top-
down inputs to visual cortex (Noudoost and Moore, 2011). We
suggest that a reward-related release of dopamine in the rule
circuit gives rise to behavioral benefits under task rule repetition.
Third, plasticity at bottom-up synapses explains feature and cat-
egory priming. Behaviorally, stimulus priming (Koch and All-
port, 2006) and category switch cost (Dreisbach et al., 2006) have
already been reported, yet the neural correlates remain to be
found. The mechanism that we propose can be tested physiolog-
ically in monkeys performing a rule-based task switching para-
digm (Mirabella et al., 2007; Caselli and Chelazzi, 2011). Fourth,
task-switching observables that depend on plasticity show in the
model short-lasting memory traces, which accumulate across few
trials. This is explained by gradual changes in the strength of
plastic synapses. A complete absence of trial history would in-
stead indicate sudden transitions: plastic synapses would be ei-
ther potentiated or depressed. Mixed evidence is available
(Brown et al., 2007; Caselli and Chelazzi, 2011) and more system-
atic studies and improved statistics are necessary to check the
presence of memory traces in task switching. Fifth, the prepara-
tory cost depends on persistent rule-selective activity across trials
(Mansouri et al., 2006; Durstewitz et al., 2010; Yamada et al.,
2010). This result predicts that a “preparatory cost” should ap-
pear for task repetition if rule cells are inactivated during the
intertrial interval. Furthermore, single-neuron physiological ex-
periments and human fMRI studies can directly test the predic-
tion that rule-selective persistent activity is maintained across
intertrial intervals, either only in block designs (when the rule
remains the same in a block of trials but varies from block to
block) or also in cued designs (when the rule is cued on single
trials).
In conclusion, we have presented a biologically based neural
circuit model for task switching that provides a synthesis and
mechanistic explanation for many neurophysiological and be-
havioral observations. At the conceptual level, it demonstrates
that all-or-none network reconfiguration underlying task switch-
ing can be accomplished through dynamical amplification of
weak top-down control signals. The notion of attractor networks
has been developed for local circuits, for instance as a plausible
mechanism for the generation of persistent activity underlying
working memory. The present study demonstrates that this basic
mechanism is computationally quite versatile and can be used as
a “building block” in models for much more complex cognitive
processes. The tweaking principle reveals that attractor dynamics
within local brain regions have broader implications for commu-
nication and executive control across a large-scale system of in-
terconnected brain areas that cooperatively give rise to task
switching.
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Lo CC, Boucher L, Paré M, Schall JD, Wang X-J (2009) Proactive inhibitory
control and attractor dynamics in countermanding action: a spiking neu-
ral circuit model. J Neurosci 29:9059 –9071. CrossRef Medline
Logan GD, Bundesen C (2003) Clever homunculus: is there an endogenous
act of control in the explicit task-cuing procedure? J Exp Psychol Hum
Percept Perform 29:575–599. CrossRef Medline
Logan GD, Cowan WB (1984) On the ability to inhibit thought and action:
a theory of an act of control. Psych Rev 91:295–327. CrossRef
Luce RD (2009) Response times: their role in inferring elementary mental
organization. New York: Oxford UP.
Mansouri FA, Matsumoto K, Tanaka K (2006) Prefrontal cell activities re-
lated to monkeys’ success and failure in adapting to rule changes in a
Wisconsin card sorting test analog. J Neurosci 26:2745–2756. CrossRef
Medline
Mansouri FA, Buckley MJ, Tanaka K (2007) Mnemonic function of the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex in conflict-induced behavioral adjustment. Sci-
ence 318:987–990. CrossRef Medline
Mansouri FA, Tanaka K, Buckley MJ (2009) Conflict-induced behavioural
adjustment: a clue to the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex. Nat
Rev Neurosci 10:141–152. CrossRef Medline
Mante V, Sussillo D, Shenoy KV, Newsome WT (2013) Context-dependent
computation by recurrent dynamics in prefrontal cortex. Nature 503:78 –
84. CrossRef Medline
Maunsell JH, Treue S (2006) Feature-based attention in visual cortex.
Trends Neurosci 29:317–322. CrossRef Medline
Mayr U, Kliegl R (2003) Differential effects of cue changes and task changes
on task-set selection costs. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 29:362–372.
CrossRef Medline
McAdams CJ, Maunsell JH (2000) Attention to both space and feature
modulates neuronal responses in macaque area V4. J Neurophysiol 83:
1751–1755. Medline
Meiran N (2000) Modeling cognitive control in task-switching. Psychol Res
63:234 –249. CrossRef Medline
Mirabella G, Bertini G, Samengo I, Kilavik BE, Frilli D, Della Libera C,
Chelazzi L (2007) Neurons in area V4 of the macaque translate attended
visual features into behaviorally relevant categories. Neuron 54:303–318.
CrossRef Medline
Monsell S (2003) Task switching. Trends Cogn Sci 7:134 –140. CrossRef
Medline
19516 • J. Neurosci., December 11, 2013 • 33(50):19504 –19517 Ardid and Wang • A Tweaking Principle Model for Executive Control
Moran J, Desimone R (1985) Selective attention gates visual processing in
the extrastriate cortex. Science 229:782–784. CrossRef Medline
Morton JB, Munakata Y (2002) Active versus latent representations: a neu-
ral network model of perseveration, dissociation, and decalage. Dev Psy-
chobiol 40:255–265. CrossRef Medline
Noudoost B, Moore T (2011) Control of visual cortical signals by prefrontal
dopamine. Nature 474:372–375. CrossRef Medline
Reynolds JH, Chelazzi L (2004) Attentional modulation of visual process-
ing. Annu Rev Neurosci 27:611– 647. CrossRef Medline
Rigotti M, Rubin DB, Wang X-J, Fusi S (2010) Internal representation of
task rules by recurrent dynamics: the importance of the diversity of neural
responses. Front Comput Neurosci 4:24. CrossRef Medline
Rigotti M, Barak O, Warden MR, Wang X-J, Daw ND, Miller EK, Fusi S
(2013) The importance of mixed selectivity in complex cognitive tasks.
Nature 497:585–590. CrossRef Medline
Rogers RD, Monsell S (1995) Costs of a predictable switch between simple
cognitive tasks. J Exp Psychol G 124:207–231. CrossRef
Rougier NP, Noelle DC, Braver TS, Cohen JD, O’Reilly RC (2005) Prefron-
tal cortex and flexible cognitive control: rules without symbols. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 102:7338 –7343. CrossRef Medline
Roy JE, Riesenhuber M, Poggio T, Miller EK (2010) Prefrontal cortex activ-
ity during flexible categorization. J Neurosci 30:8519 – 8528. CrossRef
Medline
Sakai K (2008) Task set and prefrontal cortex. Annu Rev Neurosci 31:219 –
245. CrossRef Medline
Sasaki R, Uka T (2009) Dynamic readout of behaviorally relevant signals
from area MT during task switching. Neuron 62:147–157. CrossRef
Medline
Seger CA, Miller EK (2010) Category learning in the brain. Annu Rev Neu-
rosci 33:203–219. CrossRef Medline
Sohn MH, Ursu S, Anderson JR, Stenger VA, Carter CS (2000) The role of
prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex in task switching. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 97:13448 –13453. CrossRef Medline
Soltani A, Wang X-J (2006) A biophysically based neural model of matching
law behavior: melioration by stochastic synapses. J Neurosci 26:3731–
3744. CrossRef Medline
Stoet G, Snyder LH (2004) Single neurons in posterior parietal cortex of
monkeys encode cognitive set. Neuron 42:1003–1012. CrossRef Medline
Stoet G, Snyder LH (2007a) Correlates of stimulus-response congruence in
the posterior parietal cortex. J Cogn Neurosci 19:194 –203. CrossRef
Medline
Stoet G, Snyder LH (2007b) Extensive practice does not eliminate human
switch costs. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 7:192–197. CrossRef Medline
Stroop JR (1935) Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. J Exp
Psychol 18:643– 662. CrossRef
Tanigawa H, Lu HD, Roe AW (2010) Functional organization for color and
orientation in macaque V4. Nat Neurosci 13:1542–1548. CrossRef
Medline
Vandierendonck A, Liefooghe B, Verbruggen F (2010) Task switching: in-
terplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol Bull 136:601–
626. CrossRef Medline
Wang X-J (2001) Synaptic reverberation underlying mnemonic persistent
activity. Trends Neurosci 24:455– 463. CrossRef Medline
Wang X-J (2002) Probabilistic decision making by slow reverberation in
cortical circuits. Neuron 36:955–968. CrossRef Medline
Wang X-J (2008) Decision making in recurrent neuronal circuits. Neuron
60:215–234. CrossRef Medline
Wang X-J, Liu Y, Sanchez-Vives MV, McCormick DA (2003) Adaptation
and temporal decorrelation by single neurons in the primary visual cor-
tex. J Neurophysiol 89:3279 –3293. CrossRef Medline
Wendelken C, Munakata Y, Baym C, Souza M, Bunge SA (2012) Flexible
rule use: common neural substrates in children and adults. Dev Cogn
Neurosci 2:329 –339. CrossRef Medline
Womelsdorf T, Westendorff S, Ardid S (2013) Subnetwork selection in deep
cortical layers is mediated by beta-oscillation dependent firing. Front Syst
Neurosci 7:25. CrossRef Medline
Wong KF, Wang X-J (2006) A recurrent network mechanism of time inte-
gration in perceptual decisions. J Neurosci 26:1314 –1328. CrossRef
Medline
Yamada M, Pita MC, Iijima T, Tsutsui K (2010) Rule-dependent anticipa-
tory activity in prefrontal neurons. Neurosci Res 67:162–171. CrossRef
Medline
Zeki SM (1973) Colour coding in rhesus monkey prestriate cortex. Brain
Res 53:422– 427. CrossRef Medline
Zylberberg A, Fernández Slezak D, Roelfsema PR, Dehaene S, Sigman M
(2010) The brain’s router: a cortical network model of serial process-
ing in the primate brain. PLoS Comput Biol 6:e1000765. CrossRef
Medline
Ardid and Wang • A Tweaking Principle Model for Executive Control J. Neurosci., December 11, 2013 • 33(50):19504 –19517 • 19517
